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Postcolonial 
theory and false 
dichotomies 
The essays contained in Chris Lorenz’s book 
Bordercrossings present a wide range of the 
most significant problems concerning the epis-
temological status of history. I would like to fo-
cus on the very conceptual framework within 
which those problems are identified and dis-
sected in book. The basic framework of Lorenz’s 
analysis is delineated, on the one hand, by the 
pole of objectivism and, on the other, by the 
pole of relativism. His declared aim is to find a 
way between those two extreme positions and 
transgress their limitations. The first, objectiv-
ist, pole is associated with naïve positivism and 
realism, which assumes the transparency of 
language, the possibility of adequate represen-
tation and the possibility of achieving ultimate 
unquestionable scientific truth in history. Asso-
ciated with postmodernism, the second, relativ-
ist, pole is defined not only by the rejection of 
the ideal of objective historical knowledge and 
the incommensurability of systems of knowl-
edge, but also, in some cases, by the rejection 
of the idea of reality being independent of repre-
sentation and subject positions. One of the im-
plications of this relativist position is depriving 
history of the status of a science and perceiv-
ing it rather as a kind of art or literature or as a 
political device. Examples of these relativist po-
sitions include Frank Ankersmit’s and Hayden 
White’s narrativist conception of history, postco-
lonial theory, Michel Foucault’s philosophy and 
the range of “particularistic” histories where the 
subjects are women, Afro-Americans, Jews, 
working class or sexual minorities. 
One of the reflections I had upon reading these 
essays was that perhaps the very conceptu-
al framework delineated by the opposition be-
tween objectivism and positivism, and relativ-
ism and postmodernism, is no longer the best 
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starting point for analysing the epistemological status of history. To be sure, in Lorenz’s work this 
opposition is meant to be transgressed. However, it seems that, despite his efforts, he remains 
trapped within this binary conceptual structure. The very fact that it is assumed (together with the 
conceptual divisions like ideology/knowledge, truth/fiction, objectivity/subjectivity) as a starting 
point for the discussion makes it very difficult to conceptualise in a positive way the standards of 
post-positivist objectivity and the criteria of the validity of historians’ claims to knowledge. It is be-
cause this framework is not particularly suitable for reflecting on mutual relations of history and 
politics, for conceptualising the way power participates in the processes of the production of his-
torical knowledge, and for accounting for the situatedness of knowledge. In my view, the evidence 
of this unsuitability can be found, for example, in Lorenz’s treatment of postcolonial theory and 
different “particularistic” histories of women, Afro-Americans, Jews, sexual minorities and so on. 
Lorenz locates all these histories and postcolonial theory on the relativist-postmodernist side of 
his spectrum of possible philosophical positions. They strongly contest the traditional notions of 
seemingly universalist, objectivist knowledge, so – according to the logic of the conceptual frame-
work – they must by relativist. But the question is: can they really be classified in this way?
The problem with this classification is that – as many thinkers have shown1 – radical, “judgmen-
tal” relativism is a kind of an inversion or a mirror image of positivist objectivism. It means that the 
binary of objectivism and relativism is, in fact, illusory. It also means that the “real” contestation of 
everything that is implied by positivist objectivism cannot, in fact, be based on adopting relativism. 
However, this fact can only be recognised if we seriously take into account the issue of power rela-
tions as an integral element of knowledge production processes and if we problematise the situat-
edness of these processes. Only if we do that can we see that both objectivism and relativism are 
the means by which it is possible to avoid talking about the situatedness of subjects of knowledge 
in power relations. As it is said, objectivism is a view from nowhere, from the point of god’s eye. 
But relativism is not very different; it is a view from anywhere. Obviously, relativism is sometimes 
adopted as a result of the recognition that knowledge which has claimed to be universal and ob-
jective is, in fact, a particularistic expression of the views of those who dominate. So, in this sense, 
relativism might be considered a kind of criticism of power relations, but – as many critical epis-
temologists have noticed – relativism is not a position that is able to capture the epistemological 
interests of the dominated. Those who struggle against domination – including epistemological 
domination – are not interested in saying that everything is relative, simply because it would mean 
that there are no means by which to diagnose and measure the domination, oppression and so 
on. So, what remains hidden in relativism, as well as in objectivism, is the situatedness of knowl-
edge in the relations of domination etc. (Which is not to say that relativism is never used by the 
dominated as a temporary tactic to undermine the structure of domination, or just to adopt to it.) 
In my opinion, the misguided classification of postcolonial theory as relativist is the result of the 
very choice of what is a power-blind conceptual framework that positions all theories somewhere 
on the line stretching between (positivist) objectivism and relativism. 
Obviously, a great variety of ideas and concepts are grouped under the banner of “postcolonial the-
ory”, and some of them are simply contradictory and incompatible, but what is truly the most valu-
able and challenging factor in postcolonial theorising is the insight that cannot be contained within 
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the binary oppositions of relativism and objectivism. This insight has nothing to do with the idea of 
the simple revival or affirmative revalorisation of some mythical local, authentic, particular identi-
ties and knowledge – what could be interpreted as an apotheosis of relativism but which, in fact, 
has been denounced by many postcolonial theorists as yet another trick of colonial power. The in-
sight I am talking about is connected with the problem of regaining a voice by the Others of Europe, 
but it is combined with the realisation that one of the most insidious effects of imperial and colonial 
power is the fact that even the forms of resistance and anticolonial struggle – in the field of politics, 
production of knowledge, art, literature, etc – are, to a significant extent, dictated and determined 
by western categories. (One of the examples might be anti-colonial nationalist struggles that were 
often ideologically based on the invented, quasi-local, authentic traditions, falsely believed to be an-
cient, that were actually mirror images of colonial representations of the colonised.)
By saying that the conceptual framework based on the opposition of objectivism/relativism is in-
sufficient for analysing phenomena such as postcolonial theory or minority revisionist histories, 
I want to point out that there is a number of epistemological currents that propose alternative 
frameworks. Those frameworks are critical of positivist notions of objectivity, validity and univer-
sality and, at the same time, they reject relativism for the reasons I have mention above. It is in 
these frameworks that revisionist histories created with the focus on the position of minorities 
cease to be particularistic but instead can be understood as attempt at redefining pseudo-univer-
salist, pseudo-objectivist categories that structure all kinds of scientific, academic knowledge. In 
this sense, they can be understood as striving for a new meaning of objectivity. I refer here, for ex-
ample, to the standpoint theories represented among others by Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartsock 
or, in other versions, Donna Haraway. However, what is crucial in those approaches is the fact their 
starting point is screening and questioning the relations of power that are always at play in the 
production of any knowledge. In those approaches, it is assumed that what informs the content of 
knowledge is not only the “context of justification” but also the “context of discovery”. It means that 
the condition of a “strong objectivity” (a new version of post-positivist objectivity) – as opposed to 
a “weak objectivity” of positivism – is taking into account the situatedness of knowledge and the 
agents of knowledge.2 
NOTES
1   I am particularly inspired here by Sandra Harding’s book Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking 
from Women’s Lives, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1991.
2   Ibid. 
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